#安全/对齐

突发：美国政府指示 Anthropic 关闭其最强的 Claude 模型。 Anthropic 于周五收到政府的出口管制指令。其净效果是，为遵守规定，它必须对所有客户禁用 Fable 5 和 Mythos 5。 因为有人发现了一个越狱方法，能让该模型泄露它本应拒绝提供的网络安全帮助。 Anthropic 表示，政府并未展示出一个广泛的、通用的越狱方法，能把该模型变成一个不受限制的黑客助手。 所展示的技术是狭窄的，只发现了少量已知的次要漏洞，并且产生的 capability 是其他公开模型也能提供的。 商务部长 Howard Lutnick 于周五写道，Anthropic 的 Mythos 5 和 Fable 5 模型将在美国以外的任何地方以及美国境内的外国人面临出口限制。 该模型必须保持受限，直到美国政府加强其国家安全系统，这可能会在未来几周内发生。 Anthropic 进一步表示：“我们怀疑，目前对任何模型提供商来说，完美的越狱抵抗都是不可能的。业界使用的每一种保障措施都容易受到非通用越狱的影响（在特定情况下可以引出一些网络信息），而且未来很可能最终会发现通用越狱。”

突发：美国政府指示 Anthropic 关闭其最强的 Claude 模型。 Anthropic 于周五收到政府的出口管制指令。其净效果是，为遵守规定，它必须对所有客户禁用 Fable 5 和 Mythos 5。 因为有人发现了一个越狱方法，能让该模型泄露它本应拒绝提供的网络安全帮助。 Anthropic 表示，政府并未展示出一个广泛的、通用的越狱方法，能把该模型变成一个不受限制的黑客助手。 所展示的技术是狭窄的，只发现了少量已知的次要漏洞，并且产生的 capability 是其他公开模型也能提供的。 商务部长 Howard Lutnick 于周五写道，Anthropic 的 Mythos 5 和 Fable 5 模型将在美国以外的任何地方以及美国境内的外国人面临出口限制。 该模型必须保持受限，直到美国政府加强其国家安全系统，这可能会在未来几周内发生。 Anthropic 进一步表示：“我们怀疑，目前对任何模型提供商来说，完美的越狱抵抗都是不可能的。业界使用的每一种保障措施都容易受到非通用越狱的影响（在特定情况下可以引出一些网络信息），而且未来很可能最终会发现通用越狱。”

I’ve had a number of conversations with folks inside and outside government about the current situation with Anthropic, and here is what I believe to be true: — As we know, Anthropic publicly released its Mythos class models earlier this week under the commercial name Fable. — Fable is Mythos with guardrails. But if those guardrails fail, then you’ve exposed Mythos and its advanced cyber capabilities to people who shouldn’t have them. (Keep in mind that Anthropic itself widely promoted the idea that Mythos was a cyberweapon and needed to be regulated as such. They asked for government regulation of Mythos and championed the guardrails on Fable. If there is a vulnerability — big or small — it is Anthropic’s responsibility to patch.) — A highly credible trusted partner of both Anthropic and the USG who was testing Fable came forward with a jailbreak of those guardrails. The Admin asked Dario to fix the jailbreak or de-deploy the model. Dario refused. — In their blog post, Anthropic defended its decision by saying the jailbreak isn’t serious. That is not what the trusted partner and the USG believe; nor is that kind of minimizing language consistent with Anthropic’s brand as the AI safety company. It’s difficult to fathom how they could claim a jailbreak allowing operability of a cyber weapon could be defined as not “serious.” — In the past, Anthropic has always said that safety must be top priority and taken super seriously. In this case, Anthropic prioritized the continued offering of the consumer model over safety. — In reaction, the Admin issued the export control. The Admin did this reluctantly. It’s been very surprised that Anthropic hasn’t wanted to cooperate with a reasonable safety request (ie fixing the jailbreak issue). Anthropic’s reaction is very much at odds with their branding and ethos as a safe AI research community. — The Admin’s hope now is that Anthropic remediates the safety issue, the export control is lifted, and Fable goes back into general release. The Admin wants all of this to happen as soon as possible. It is frankly bewildered that Anthropic hasn’t wanted to comply with safety requests that it previously said were its highest priority. — Those trying to misdirect and tie this action to the prior DoW/Anthropic issues are wrong. The Admin values Anthropic’s technical capabilities and feels that this issue, while serious, should be easily resolved. The ball is in Anthropic’s court.

The US government, citing national security authorities, has issued an export control directive to suspend all access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 by any foreign national, whether inside or outside the United States, including foreign national Anthropic employees. The net effect of this order is that we must abruptly disable Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all our customers to ensure compliance. Access to all other Claude models is not affected. We apologize for this disruption to our customers. We believe this is a misunderstanding and are working to restore access as soon as possible. Read our full statement: https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access

We’re rolling out changes to make Fable 5’s safeguards for frontier LLM development visible. Starting this week, flagged requests will visibly fall back to Opus 4.8—the same as our safeguards for cyber and bio. You will see this every time it happens. On the API, any flagged requests will return a reason for their refusal (coming to server-side fallback in the next few days). We wanted to deploy Fable 5 to our users quickly and safely. Visible safeguards can be probed, so they have to be robust, which takes time to get right. Invisible safeguards can be targeted more narrowly, allowing us to ship quickly with very few false positives. We went with invisible safeguards for this reason—and that was the wrong tradeoff. You should have visibility into the safeguards we have in place, and why. We’re sorry for not getting the balance right. Making the safeguards visible makes them easier to work around, so keeping them robust to jailbreaks will unfortunately mean more false positives while we improve the classifiers. We're also tuning our bio and cyber classifiers to trigger less often on harmless requests. We know this is frustrating and we’ll do our best to keep this period as short as possible. If you think a request has been mistakenly flagged: run /feedback in Claude Code, click thumbs-down on the fallback in http://Claude.ai or Cowork, or file the safeguard appeal form for API requests. Your reports help us tune these classifiers and we appreciate your feedback. https://support.claude.com/en/articles/8241253-safeguards-warnings-and-appeals